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STOCHASTIC PROBLEMS IN THE SIMULATION OF LABOR SUPPLY
ABSTRACT
Modern work in labor supply attempts to account for nonlinear budget sets
created by government tax and transfer programs. Progressive taxation leads to
nonlinear convex budget sets while the earned income credit, social security
contributions, AFDC, and the proposed NIT plans all lead to nonlinear, nonconve
budget sets. Where nonlinear budget sets occur, the expected value of the
random variable, labor supply, can no longer be calculated by simply 'plugging
in' the estimated coefficients. Properties of the stochastic terms which arise
from the residual or from a stochastic preference structure need to be accounted
for. This paper considers both analytical approaches and Monte Carlo approaches
to the problem. We attempt to find accurate and low cost computational
techniques which would permit extensive use of simulation methodology. Large
samples are typically included in such simulations which makes computational
techniques an important consideration. But these large samples may also lead to
simplifications in computational techniques because of the averaging process used
in calculation of simulation results. This paper investigates the tradeoffs








Suppose that we have successfully estimated a structural model of labor
supply. Given the large amount of public interest in the question of income tax
reform, an important use of the estimated model would be to assess the possible
effects on labor supply, tax revenue, and individual welfare of proposed reforms.
These evaluations are sometimes performed using local elasticity estimates.
Mowever, such a simplified analysis may not be very accurate for the rather large
changes contemplated in many tax reform proposals. Another problem which arises
with simplified elasticity calculations is that they often ignore the
considerable heterogeneity of the population response. A better approach would
seem to be to use the estimated structural model to predict the effect of the
tax changes. Thus, we would need to derive analytically the statistical
expectation of the population response under the proposed changes; or if
analytical derivation proves to be mathematically intractible, a Monte Carlo
approach would provide the results.
But an important potential problem arises when such simulations are
conducted. This problem arises because of the nonlinear, and often nonconvex,
budget sets which arise due to progressive income taxation as well as other tax
and transfer policies. In a nonlinear econometric model with nonlinearities of
this type, it is not necessarily the case that the sources of stochastic
variation have an additive zero expectation term within a simulation exercise.
Nor is it the case that such effects are small, necessarily, since 'R2's' in
labor supply models are typically not that high, i.e., much unexplained residual
variation remains after the modelhasbeen specified and estimated. Thus, for a
particular individual we might well expect that careful treatment of the
stochastic specification in calculating the appropriate expectation would be
quiteimportant.Yet for the population at large, or equivalently a very large2
sample, the importance of the stochastic components is unclear. In the sample if
thevariationof the exogenous variable is sufficiently large and the fit of the
equation sifficiently good, the effect of the stochastic component may be small.
Perhaps a more promising approach is to realize that extremely accurate
computation for each individual may not be needed, because a law of large numbers
type result may hold for the entire sample. That is, rather crude computational
techniques may be used for each individual, but the sample mean values can still
be quite accurate. Significant computational savings occur because say only one
Monte Carlo draw is done for each individual. While the variance of the
predicted response of that given individual may be large, in the complete sample
the large variance may not beimportant due toa large number type of averaging.
Thistype of technical question is the major focus of this paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section I we outline the problem of
laborsupply with nonlinear budget constraints. I also specify and use estimates
of a linear supply model. This section and the estimates follow from Hausman
(1979). In Section II the stochastic problems which arise in simulation of
nonlinear budget set models are studied. Both analytical and Monte Carlo
approaches are considered. Comparative statistics for computer times are given
to indicate potential savings from the use of simple computational techniques.
Then, in Section III I consider tax reform proposals. The type of tax reform
proposal considered, is a reduction of tax rates by 10% to 30%. Here we
consider not only labor supply effects and welfare effects, but we also look at
tax revenue considerations. It is important to emphasize at the outset that all—3—
analysis takes place within a partial equilibrium framework. Thus, general
equilibrium effects which might be quite important, especially in long—run
response, are not treated.1'• TheEconometrics of Labor Supply with Taxes
The essential feature which distinguishes econometric models of labor supply
with taxes from traditional demand models is the non—constancy of the net, after
tax wage. Except for the case of a proportional tax system, the net wage depends
on hours worked because of the operation of the tax system. Also, the marginal
net wage depends on the specific budget segment that the individual's
indifference curve is tangent to. Thus, econometric techniques need to be
devised which can treat the nonlinearity of the budget set. An econometric
model needs to take the exogenous nonlinear budget set and to explain the
individual choice of desired hours. We first describe such a model for convex
and nonconvex budget sets. As expected, the convex case is simpler to deal with.
We then consider other issues of model specification such as variation in tastes,
and fixed costs to working.
Econometric estimation is quite straightforward in the case of a convex
budget set. Convex budget sets occur due to the operation of a progressive tax
system. Let us first analyze the simplest case, that of a progressive tax on
labor income so that the marginal tax rate is non—decreasing. In figure 1.1
threemarginal tax rates are considered, t1, t2, t3, which lead to three after—
tax net wages, w1, w2, w3, where W =w(l—t1).y denotesnon—labor income. H1
andH2 correspond to kinkpoint hours which occur at the intersection of two tax
brackets.But an important addition to the diagram are the "virtual" incomes Y2
and y3, which follow from extension of a given budget segment to the vertical
axis.They are denoted as virtual income because if theindividual faced the
linearbudget set B2 =(w2,y2),
he would still choose hours of work h* as in
figure 1.1. An important property of such convex budget sets in the presence of
strictly quasi—concave preferences, is that only one tangency (at most) will
exist between the individual indifference curves and the budget set. HausinanFigure 1.1
(1979b) uses this result to demonstrate that
supply function is necessary for estimation.
function is not necessary.
Since a unique tangency or a corner solution at zero hours will determine
desired hours of work, we need only determine where the tangency occurs. To do
so we begin with a slight generalization of the usual type of labor supply
specification
(2.1) h =(w,y, z, )+ C = h*+C
wherew is a vector of net wages, y is a vector of virtual incomes, z are
individual socioeconomic variables,is the unknown vector of coefficients
assumed fixed over the population, and c is a stochastic term whichrepresents
the divergence between desired hours h* and actual hours. The typical
specification that has been used in () islinear cr log linear and scalar w
and y corresponding to the market wage and nonlabor income. The stochastic term





a specification of the labor
form of the underlying utility6
workedexists. However, 0h .Hwhere H is a physical maximum to hoursworked.
We also assume that when the 8's are estimated that the Slutsky conditions are
satisfied so that ()arises from concave preferences.
The problem to be solved is to find h* when the individual is faced with the
convex budget set, B for i=1,...,m. To find h* we take the specification of
desired hours on a given budget segment B1
(1.2)h=g (w., y, z, )
Calculate h and if 0 <h
<
H1where the H.' s are kink point hours in figure 1 •1
then h is feasible and represents the unique tangency of the indifference curves
and the budget set. If h 0, then zero hours is the desired amount of work.
However, if h* exceeds H1 it is not feasible so we move on to try the next budget
segment. If H1 h <H2 we again would have the unique optimum. If we have
bracketed the kink point so that h >H1and h <H1,then h* =H1so that
desired hours fall at the kink point. Otherwise weon and calculate h. By
tryingout all the segments we will either find a tangency or find that h >
forall i in which case h* =H.Then a nonlinear least squares procedures or
Tobit procedure to take account of minimum at zero should be used to compute the
unknown8 parameters. The statistical procedure would basically minimize the sum
N
2 of I(h. —h)where jrepresentsindividuals in the sample. Perhaps a
:1=1
better technique would be to use Tobit which enforces theconstraint that 0.
The case of the nonconvex budget is more complicated because equation (1.2)
can lead to more than one feasible tangency which leads to many potential hi's.
Non—convex budget sets arise from the presence of government transfer programs.
Thefour most important programs of this type are lo income tax credit, AFDC,
Social Security benefits, and a negative income tax (NIT) program. In Figure
1.2we indicate a common type of non—convex budget set. In Figure 1.2 we have
two tangencies of the indifference curve with the budget set which seems to lead7
Figure 1.2
How can we decide which of these feasible hi's is the global optimum?
Burtless—Hausman (1978) initially demonstrated thetechniqueof working
backwards from the labor supply specification of equation (2.2) to the
underlying preferences which can be represented by a utility function. The basic
idea to make use of Roy's identity which generated the labor supply function from




= h=g(w, y1, z, 8) 1
along a given budget segment. So long as the Slutsky condition holds then
v(w ,y) can always be recovered by solving the differential equation (2.3).
I I
fact, v( ) often has a quite simple closed form for commonly used labor supply




For the linear supply specification h* =cw+y+zy,whichis used in
I I I
this paper, Hausinan (1979a) solved for the indirect utility function
w. ct z.Y
(1.4) v (w.,, y.) =e.(y+- w.—— +
11 p 1
Giventhe indirect utility function, all of the feasible tangencies can be
compared, and the tangency with highest utility is chosen as the preferred hours
of work, h*. Then as with the convex budget set case, we can use either
nonlinear least squares or a Tobit procedure to estimate the unknown
coefficients. While using a specific parameterization of the utility function
seems upsetting to some people, it should be realized that writing down a labor
supply function as in equation (1.2) is equivalent to writing down a utility
function under the assumption of utility maximization. To the extent that the
labor supply specification yields a robust approximation to the data, the
associated utility function will also provide a od approximation to the
underlying preferences. The utility function allows us to make the global
comparisons to determine the preferred hours of labor supply. The convex case
needs only local comparisons, but the nonconvex case requires global comparisons
because of the possiblility of multiple tangencies of indifference curves with
the budget set.
We next introduce the possibility of variation in tastes. In the labor
supply specification of equation (1.1), all individuals are assumed to have
identical 's so that variation of observationally equivalent individuals must
arise solely from c. However, empirical studies seem to do an inadequate job of
explaining observed hours of work under the assumption of the representative
individual. Burtless—Hausman (1978) allowed for variation in preferences by
permittingto be randomly distributed in the population. Their results9
indicated that variation in 13 seemed nre important than variation in CL.They
also found that variation inrepresented approximately 8 times as much of the
unexplained variance as did variation in .Aieven nore satisfactory procedure
would be to allow all the taste coefficients to vary in the population. At
present the requirement of ev-aluating multiple integrals over nonrectangular
regions for the more general specification has led to the use of the simple case
of one or two taste coefficients varying. Further research is needed to
determine whether this more complex specification would be an important
improvement over current nodels.
Another consideration which can have an important effect on the budget set
for women's labor force participation is fixed costs to working. Transportation
costs, the presence of young children, and search costs of finding a job can lead
to a fixed cost element in the labor supply decision. The basic effect of fixed
costs is to introduce a nonconvexity in the budget set at the origin. Thus, even
if the original budget is convex as in Figure 1.1 the presence of fixed costs
leads to a minimum number of hours H0, which depends on the wage, below which an




original convex budget set drawn by the dotted line. However, the presence of
fixed costs lowers the effective budget set to the point Yi —FC.The individual
would not choose to work less than H0 hours because she would be better off at
zero hours. This nonconvexity invalidates the simple reservation wage theory of
labor force participation since hours also need to be accounted for. Hausman
(1979a) in a labor force participation study of welfare mothers found average
fixed costs to be on the order of $100 per month. The importaflce of fixed costs
could explain the often noted empirical fact that very few individuals are
observed working less than 10 or 15 hours per week.
We estimated a model of labor supply (Hausman (1979)) which takes full
accountof the effect of taxation for two groups in the population. The labor
supply of husbands and wives is considered for 1975 for a sample from the
MichiganIncome Dynamics Data. Budget sets were constructed using both federal
and state tax regulations, c.f., Hausman (1979). It is important to note that we
did not have access to actual tax return data. Instead, we imputed deductions
beyond the standard deduction using population averages. At present no data
source has both all the necessary labor supply data in addition to actual income
tax return information.1 At the current stage of model development only a single
person can be considered so that the husband was treated as the primaryworker in
a family with the wife as the secondary worker. A model which allows for joint
family labor supply decisions seems the obvious next goal of our researtch. For
both husbands and wives we consider each of two cases: a convex budget set where
the effects of FICA, the earned income credit, and the standard deduction are
averaged to produce a convex budget set and a complete nonconvex budget set where
the effect of each program is to introduce a nonconvexity.
Along each segment the basic labor supply model which is used is linear in
the wage and virtual income11
(1.5)h =aw.+ 8y. + zy
where h* is desired hours, Wj is the netwage on segment i, yl is virtual
income for segment i, and z are socioeconomic variables.For fixed andI
desired hours h* may not be feasible since h*may be greater than or less than
the hours at the end points of the budgetsegment H.and H.. If desired hours
4._I 1
are feasible than we have a tangency of the indifference curve and thebudget
segment. In the case of a convex budget set this tangency is unique, and we then
use our stochastic specification for the deviation of actual hours from desired
hours for person jas -
(1.6)h. =h*.+
.1 13 J
Since observed hours h. > 0 the stochastic termn.4sassumed o be independent
3
truncated normal across individuals in the population. Thus,we have a Tobit
specification for the hours worked variable. However, if h =0we assume that
the individuals do not choose to work and so set h. =0also. Since the final
3
model has two sources of stochastic variation the interpretation of
nj differs
from standard models. Here we picture the individual facedby a choice from a
set of jobs which differ in normal (long run) hours worked. He chooses thatjob
closest to his h*. But observedh may differ due to unexpected layoffs,
short time, overtime, or poor health. As an empirical matterwe find the
standard deviation of to be reasonably small which indicates that
individuals are successful in matching jobs to their desired hoursof work. 1a
If the budget set is non—convex M is not necessarily unique because
multiple tangencies can occur between the indifference curves and thebudget set.
Then h. is chosen as the tangency which lead to maximumutility which is
determined by use of the corresponding indirect utility function fromequation
(1.4) We again use the stochastic specification ofequation (1.6) to express the
deviation of actual hours from desired hours of work. It isinteresting to12
note that although certain kink points such as H in Figure 1.2in the non—convex
case cannot correspond to desired hours, we might stillobserve them as actual
hours or work due to the stochastic term in the model.
The second source of stochastic variation in the model arises from a
distribution of tastes in the population. In line with our previous research we
specifyto be a truncated normal random variable which falls in theinterval
(—°°,0).An upper limit of zero is specified since we assume that leisureis a
normal good. Thus, asranges over the permissable interval thereis a certain
probability that any amount of hours corresponds to desired hours..As an
empiricalmatterturns out to be the major source of stochastic variation in
the model which confirms our previous findings reported in Burtless—Hausman
(1978)2
The estimated results for husbands are presented along with asymptotic
standard errors in Table 1.1. The coefficients are generally estimated quite
precisely, especially the wage and non—labor incomecoefficients. The
socioeconomic variables have coefficients of reasonable magnitude except the
house equity which perhaps reflects factors in the mortgagecredit market and the
special tax treatment of houses. We first note that the uncompensated wage
coefficient is essentially zero. Not only is the estimate close to zero but the
estimated standard error is quite small. In the extreme case of two standard
deviations from the estimate for the nonconvex case, a change in the net wageof
$1.00 along a budget segment leads to an expected increase inannual hours worked
of 32.5 which is less than 2% of the sample mean. The expected changein hours
is only 11.3 while in the convex case the expected change in annual hoursis .2.
The finding of an extremely small uncompensated wage effectis in accord with the
previous empirical findings. Thus the direct effect ofincome taxation which
reduces the net wage has almost no effect on hours worked among husbands.13
TABLE1.1 HUSBANDSANNIJAL HOURSOF WORK (THousDs)*
Variable Convex Nonconvex
1.p —Non—laborincome (1000's) 2.037 1.061 8
(.0729) (.2145)
2. .62142 .145141 8 (.023k) (.0570)




5.Childrenunder 6 —.0039 .0113
(.0255) (.0635)
6. Familysize .0341 .0657
(.0170) (.0310)
7. (Age ]45, o) —.0011 —.0055
(.0108) (.0235)
8.House equity (1000's) .0026 .0036
(.0009) (.0008)




11. Mean8 —.166 —.153
12. StandardDeviation of B .156 .141
13. Medianof B —.120
*Asymptoticstandard. error are presented below each estimated
coefficient.14
However,our results do differ from previous studies in indicating a
siqnificant income effect. Remember that we allow a distribution of preferences
in the population. The estimated probability density for the nonconvex case is
shown in Figure 1.4. The distribution has substantial skewness since it is the
extreme left tail of the truncated normal distribution with the standard
deviation approximately equal to the mean in magnitude. This finding is repeated
in the convexcase with the skewness even more pronounced. Myprevious work has
alsofoundthis general form even when different probability densities are used,
e.g., Hausman (l979a) where a Weibull density is used. The underlying parameters
of the preference distribution are estimate quite precisely so that the finding
is not likely to be an accidental occurence.
Figure 1.4
Nextwe present the empirical results for a sample of married women. Our
sample consists of the wives of the males used in the previous section. Previous
research has indicated that married womenst labor supply decisions are sensitive
to the net wage so that we would expect to find that taxes create both an
important uncompensated wage effect and an income effect as they do for
husbands. As we previously stated, we treat wives labor supply decisions
conditional on husband's earned income. Thus, wives are considered to be15
secondary workers which may not be a proper assumption. Since in oursample
labor force participation of husbands is near 100% while wives isnear 50%
perhaps treating wives earnings conditional on husbands earnings is not a
particularly bad assumption. However, the crucial question is whether husbands
earnings should enter the wives labor supply decision asexogenous non—labor
income. It is probable that some jointness in decisionmaking takes place when
the husband adjusts his hours of work to his wife'searnings. A family labor
supply model would be able to treat these problems better, but here weonly
provide estimates for the conditional uvdel.
We turn now to the estimates of the labor supply equations whichare
presented in Table 2.2. We present estimates for a convexif led budget set, for
the complete nonconvex budget set, and for a nonconvexbudget set with fixed
costs included. First note that we find substantial uncompensatedwage and
income elasticities. For the average woman who isworking full time we find the
uncompensated wage elasticity to be .995 for the nonconvex results and a similar
magnitude for the convex results, .978, is found. When fixed costs are added the
uncompensated wage elasticity falls to .9065. Thus, all three estimates indicate
that the effect'of the income tax in decreasing the aftertax, net wage is
important in determining wives labor supply. Since wives netwage is lowered
substantially by the presence of the 'marriage tax' the tax effectmay be much
greater than if wives earnings were not added to husbands earnings for tax
purposes. On the other hand, we also find an important effect of non—labor
income (and actual income). The elasticity at the means isapproximately —.2.
This effect causes larger labor supply by wives because their husbandsearnings
are reduced by taxes. The two effects have opposite sign so that a simulation is
needed to evaluate the net effect of the marriage tax.
In this section we have presented our specification of laborsupply in the16
Table1.2 Wives Annual Hours (Thousands)
Variables Convex Non—Convex Non—Convex with Fixed Costs
1. v —Income(1,000's) 2.0958 1.7519 2.0216
(.1389) (.11vr5) (.1186)
2. a .5390 .1836 .5262
(.b16o) 0b90) (.0711)
3. a —Wage .11.951 .5058 .16o8
(.2310) (.0932) (.1062)
14• Intercept .5790 .3501 .62311.
(.9517) (.19oT) (.5766)
5.FamilySize .2387 .2202 .21h11.
(.1270) (.0773) (.1259)
6.Children<6 —.1695 -.1123 .11472'
(.311.26) (.2239) (.1576)
7. College Education —.7851 —.7205 —.6903
(.14216) (.2390) (.389)





10.Health _.11.77l —.3139 —.3581
(.72714) (.14753) (.'4614'r)








15. a11 .3086 .2907. .2801
(.2388) (.2099) t..2386)
16. Mean of —.125 —.118.
17. Standard deviation of .112 .109 .113
18. Median of —.089 —.085 —.08817
presence of nonlinear convex budget sets and nonconvex budget sets. The
stochastic specification has been emphasized since it will play an important role
in the simulation results. We now consider how the results can be used to
simulate the effects of tax reform. We emphasize computational considerations so
that the simulations can be conducted at low or moderate costs of computer time.II. Tax Change Evaluation
In this section we develop formulae for expected hours of work, expected tax
revenue, and expected deadweight loss given our model of labor supply and the
estimates of the previous section. The main question that we attempt to answer
in this section is how much attention must be paid to the stochastic components
of the specification to obtain accurate estimates. We consider both analytical
and Monte Carlo approaches to the problem. We want to find accurate and low cost
computational techniques which permit use of simulation methodology. At the sa'!le
time keep in mind the typically large samples which are involved in a
simulation. These large samples make computational techniques an important
consideration. But the large samples may also allow possible simplifications in
computational techniques because of the averaging process used in calculation
of simulation results.
For a given person j the desired hours of work on budget segment i is
specified to be
(2.1) h.. =aw..+ y.. + Z.y + r. =h.+
ii 1J 1J J 3 13 3
where w• is the net, after tax wage on segment i and y.. is virtual income for
segment i, i.e., the intercept of segment i extended back to the vertical axis in
Figure 1.1. The vector Z. represents socioeconomic characteristics of individual
j. Now if and y.. were determined exogenously and n, ,ywere fixed
coefficients, then we could use the standard linear expectation rules to derive
Eh.. =aw+y..+Z.y.Of course, we specifyto be distributed randomly in
13ij 13 J
the population in the intervals (-oo,O). But the extension to stochasticdoes
not create much difficulty because again give exogenous and y.. we would
1
(2.2) E.h. =aw..+ + Z•y =nw..+ —
° Li—
=cw.. + 3y.. +Z.y
:1_J 13 319
where and are the underlying parameters of the non—truncated distribution
for 8, respectively, whileandare the standard normal density function and
distribution function, respectively. The problem to befaced, then, is that
WijandYijare determined by the budget segment Bij which depends
on two stochastic components, ii. and v. =8-•8. Thus, we have the problem that
therighthand side variables are not determined exogenously. Nord9 we have a
simple formula for their expectation as we would in the linearsimultaneous
equationscase. Thus, not unexpectedly, we need to consider the complete budget
set when calculating the conditional expectation of hours worked. taxrevenue
paid, or deadweight loss and account for the 'endogeneity' ofWij and
Yij. It turns out to be the nonlinearity of the budget set together with the
distribution of preferences specification which cause thesignificant costs of
labor supply simultaions. As we indicate below, the solution forthat part of
the 8 distribution which corresponds to a given budgetsegment is a non—trivial
calculation.
We first consider the analytical conditional expectation for hours worked.
The expectation is
I I ' I.- • ' E h. = (h*.(8)+n.)f(rj.)f(i3)dii. d8
i=i 8. . q.(8) 1] 3 3 3
1l,j
rn-ir•# + Z (h*. +r)(F(8..) +F(8. j) f(n.) dii.
i1 r. 13 3 13 i—l,j 3 3
1,j
As we discussed inthe last section for8 8 which isthe minimum 8which
3
causes desired hours to be positive, h*. > 0, we assume that actual hours h. =0.
13 3
Thus equation (2.3) calculate the expectation of actual hours h.over the range
for which desired hours h. are positive. The firstsum in equation corresponds
to the case where desired hours fall along a budgetsegment, i1,m. The range of20
8's which causes this to happen are denoted(8. .,8..). Note that in the
i—1,j 3
nonconvex case some segzrents may have thentergral end pOifltS equa1 which means
that desired hours will not fall anywhere onthe segment. It is basicaLly this
calculation which leads to the greatest expense in simulationsince calculation
of the univariate and b±variate integrals is notthat costly. The nonconvox
budget set of Figure 1.2 indicates the possibilityof an Lndfference curve which
is tangent to two budget segments simultaneously.Thus in the nonconvex case
there are portions of the budget segment which cannotcorrespond co desired
hours. For this possibility to happen, thendirecc utility fUflCCiOfl Of equation
(1.4) is equal for a given 8 for two sets of w1's and y1ts.Calculation of
these 8's for each nonconvexity in tlie budget set requiresthe iterative solution
of a nonlinear equation. Given the further facts thatthe points of mutual
tangency are unknown and that complete budget segments maybe skipped over, the
computations of the (8. .,8. .)forall budget segments i1,m is a rather
1,j 13
complicated task. Thus, we look for possible simplificationsin simulation to
reduce both the computer costs and the required programmingtime.
The outer integral in equation (2.3) determinesdesired hours h*.(B).
4.3
But actual houTs h.j= (8) + flj.Theinner integral accounts for this
second source of stochastic variation. Note that for largenegative values of ri.
we have h.. < 0. Thus q. .(8) =h.(8) which is the minimum value of nwhich
13 1] 13
keeps actual hours positive. The second sumin equation (2.3) corresponds to
desired hours falling at one of the m—l curves, or kink points,of the budget
set. The lower limit to the integral, r.., againdetermines the range for
positive h...
13
Evaluation of the integrals in equation (2.3) is not especiallydifficult,
even given the bivariate integrals. Conditioningformulae can be used and known
partialfraction expansions for univariate integrals lead to quickevaluation.21
These simplifications follow basically from the linearspecifications of h. in
equation (2.1). Unfortunately, the computation of integrals becomesconsiderably
more complicated when we want to calculate expected deadweight loss dueto the
nonlinearity of the expenditure function. The expenditure function which
corresponds to the indirect utility function of equation (1.4) is
—8w.. Z.y (2.4) — 13 e(w.., U.) —e U. —- w.+- — —r
Thenonlinearity arises from 8 appearing in both the exponential and in the
denominators of the coefficients. For a given 8 deadweight loss ismeasured by
calculating either the compensated or equivalent variation viatheexpenditure
function of equation (2.4) and then subtracting offcompensated taxes paid, using
the definition of Diamond—McFadden (l974)., Hausman (l979c) has demonstratedthe
necessity of doing the correct Hicksian measure of consumer's surplus becauseuse
of the incorrect Marshallian measure can lead tovery large errors in calculation
of the deadweight loss. For calculation of deadweight lossequation. (2.3) is
altered to account for the deadweight loss for 8's whichcorrespond to zero hours
of work. Otherwise, the general formula remains thesame with the main
difference that the nonlinear calculation required fordeadweight loss makes
computation considerably more slow than in the case of hours worked which isa
linear function of 8. Conditioning formulae for theintegrals are no longer
applicable and quadrature methods to evaluate the univariate and bivariate
integrals are now required.
To evaluate computation techniques we tried four approaches listed in order
of decreasing computational burden on a sample of men in 1975 from thePSID data
base:22
1. Analytical evaluation, via the computer, of the integralsin equation
(2.3). For the nonlinear deadweight loss calculation we tookthe
corresponding to the mean B on the interval (. ., s..) sothat
complete quadrature methods were not necessary toevaluate the integrals.
2. The distribution of B was still integrated over, but oneMonte Carlo
draw from a normal distribution was done for ii..
.3
3. The distribution ofwas integrated over, and 11.wasset to zero.
.3
4. 8wastaken at its mean value=)i
Correspondingto 8 we find M. (8) and n. is set to zero. This techniquealso
removes any need for integration for taxes paid orcalculation of deadweight
loss.
Note that the second approach leads to unbiased(or consistent) estimates of
the expectation which will have more variance than theactual expectations of the
first approach due to the variance created by theMonte—Carlo draws. However, we
consider a sample of 200 men to see whether the appropriatelaw of large numbers
works fast enough for this consideration not to be important.Potential bias is
created by apporach (3) since the expectation of .ispositive and decreases
along each segment as 8. increases. Lastly, approach(4) creates additional bias
because it runs afoul of the rule that the expectationof a nonlinear function is
not equal, in general, to the. function of the expectation.Potential problems
arise here for both hours of work and deadweight loss becauseof the nonlinearity
of the budget set.
In Table 3.1 we consider the four techniques onthe first five men in our
simulation file to see what happens at the individual level.Column 1 gives
actual hours, while the next three columns calculate the expectationsof hours
corresponding to methods (1) —(4).The next two sets of columns correspond to
the expectation of taxes paid and the expectationof deadweight loss using che
equivalent variation measure.23
Since method (I) leads to the correct evaluation of the expectation, it
provides the standard of comparison for methods (2) —(4).For labor supply we
see that method (2) leads to considerable variance, as expected. Method (3)
which sets n= 0gives identical results to method (1). Method(4) which takes
the mean 8 leads to some bias, although only a small amount. For expected
taxes paid methods (3) and (4) again have bias which is somewhat larger in this
case. Lastly, deadweight loss seems most sensitive to the technique which is
used. Techniques (3) and (4) are off by about 7% in these calculations. Thus,
our tentative conclusion for individual calculations is that for labor supply
and taxes paid method (3) is probably an appropriate techniques to use.5
However, for deadweight loss full analytical evaluation of the integrals seems
necessary for accurate calculation of the expectation.
We now turn to the major use of simulation for tax changes. We simulate
over a file of approximately 225 men from the PSID file to see what happens to
accuracy for mean changes. This file was found large enough to capture the
limiting behavior of the different evaluation methods. Note that a substantial
amount of computer processing time is involved here.6 Taking the amount of time
to do method (1) as unity, we find that method (2) takes .560 while method (3)
takes .500 as long and method (4) takes .360 as long. Where many simulations
are done over tax files which have thousands of entries these time consideration
can become quite important. Given the nonlinearity of the problem, the
simulations can take up large amounts of computer time.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the expansions would require a full scale Monte Carlostudy in itself. Yet such
information might be very helpful, especially if the standarderrors for the
caclulatjons in Table 3.2 turn out to be sizable. We need to remember that
"parameter uncertainty" does not average out by a large numberstype of result in
simulations because of perfect correlation across sample draws in theuse of
parameter values. This area seems to be an important aspect of future research
in the field. We now turn to evaluation of some proposed taxchanges in the next
section. Method (3) is used for expected hours and expected taxers whilewe use
method (1) to evaluate expected changes in deadweight loss.26
III. Simulation Results
In this section we consider the effect of two different types of tax
systems. The first type of tax is the current U.S. tax on labor income including
both the income tax and payroll tax. We compare it to a no tax situation.
To measure the change in labor supply we calculate the change in expected hours
of work using equation (2.3). The appropriate choice for the change in individual
welfare is not quite as clear. We use the equivalent variation calculated from
the expenditure function of equation (2.4). Choice of the equivalent variation
as the measure of deadweight loss, or the excess burden of taxation, seems
appropriate since we later consider changes from the current system to an altered
tax system. Since in the altered tax system, individual welfare may be higher,
we want to know the cost (in utility) of staying with the current system. But
two possible objections to our measure is that we aggregate across individuals,
giving each individual the same weight in the implicit social welfare function, and
that different individuals are allowed different coefficients in their expenditure
functions. The problems created for analysis of vertical equity considerations by
these choices are discussed in Atkinson—Stiglitz (1976). The latter problem may
not be especially serious since paramter differences arise from a distribution of
preferences which is common to the entire population.
The other type of tax system that we consider is a cut in tax rates of a
given percentage. We consider the expected change in labor supply, the expected
change in tax revenue, and the expected change in deadweight loss from the current
system. Much recent attention has focussed on the revenue effects of a change in
the income tax rates. It is important to note that our analysis is wholly
partial equilibrium in nature. We look only at changes in expected labor supply.
Thus potentially important factors such as changes in market wages and changes in
inputs of other factors of production are not considered. A more complex general27
equilibrium model is needed to answer these questions. Also since tax revenues
will be decreasing, the problem of compensation arises. The problem of potential
versus actual compensation was the basis of the Kaldor—Hicks—Scitovsky--Snmuelson
—Little debate of the 1940's. Without the choice of an explicit social welfare
function we cannot resolve this problem. But we assume no post—tax
redistribution of income among individuals, since such actual (rather than
potential) compensation is unlikely to take place.
iflTable .I we1001:attheeffect ofthecurrert ta:: svstenfor
categories defined by the market wage.7 Overall, we find that the tax system
decreases labor supply by 8.5% and the mean deadweight loss as a pronortion of
taxrevenueraised is 28.7%. We note important differences among the five
categories.
Table 3.1 Mean Tax Results for Husbands
I I
Market DWL/Tax DWL/Net Change in
Wage DWL Revenue Income Labor Supp].y
1. $3.15 $ 66 9.4% 0.8% —4.5%
2. $4.72 $204 14.4% 2.0% —6.5%
3. $5.87 $387 19.0% 3.1% —8.5%
4. $7.06 $633 23.7% 4.5% —10.1%
5. $10.01 $1749 39.5% 9.9% —12.8%
I I I I—28--
First, we see that deadweight loss rises rapidly with the market wage as we
expected. In terms of the welfare cost of the tax we see that the ratio of
deadweight loss to tax revenue raised starts at 9.4% and rises to 39.5% by the
time we reach the highest wage category. We see that the cost of raising
revenue via the income and payroll taxes is not negligible. In terms of a
distributional measure we see that the ratio of deadweight loss to net income
also rises rapidly. In fact, this measure indicates that individuals in the
highest wage category bear a cost about 10 times the lowest category while
individuals in the second highest category bear a cost 5 times as high. Without a
specific social welfare measure, we cannot decide whether the current tax system
has too much, too little, or about the right amount of progressiveness. But the
measures of Table 3.1 seem an important step in thinking about the problem.
Lastly, note that the change in labor supply from the no tax situation again
rises with the wage category. The high marginal tax brackets have a
significantly greater effect on labor supply than do the low tax brackets.
We now do a similar set of calculations of our sample of wives. While we
found both significant deadweight loss and an important effect on labor supply
for husbands compared to the no tax situation, the situation is more complicated
for wives. First, about half of all wives do not rk. In the absence of an
income tax, the net wage would rise causing some of them to decide to work and
others to increase their labor supply. But, at the same time their husbandst
after tax earnings would also rise which has the opposite effect on labor force
participation. Thus, both effects must be accounted for in considering the
effects of the income tax.Overall for wives, we find the ratio of deadweight lossto tax revenue to be
18.4%. But it should be remembered that this ratiounderstates the effect on
labor force participants alone. For laborsupply, we find that taxes serve to
increase labor supply in the lowestwage category, but decrease labor supply as
the wage rises. Overall, they decrease laborsupply by 18.2%. Thus, again for
wives we see that the current income taxsystem has both important labor supply
effect and imposes a significant cost in welfareterms for raising tax revenue.
We now turn to a consideration of Kemp—Rothtype tax proposals. We will
consider two levels of tax cuts, 10% and 30%. Thequestion which has been
focussed on most is what effect these tax cuts wouldhave on tax revenues. Our
resultsare partial equilibritim sothat general equilibrium effects are not
accountedfor. The maineffecthere arises from the change in laborsupply. But
increasedlabor also movessomeindividuals into higher taxbrackets.Both
effectsneed to be accounted for. In Table 33 wepresent the two Kemp—.Roth
simulation results. For the 10% tax deductionmean hours of labor supply for
husbands rise
-. 29—


































Table3.3 Kemp-Roth Tax Cut Proposals for Husbands
10% Tax Cut 30% Tax Cut
Market DW[/TaxDWL/NetChange in DWL/Tax DWL/NetChange in
Wage RevenueIncome Labor SupplyRevenue IncomeLabor Supply
1 $3.15 8.5% .7% +.4% 6.8% .4% +1.3%
2$4.72 13.3% 1.7% +.5% 10.9% 1.1% +1.6%
3 $5.87 17.4% 2.6% +.9% 14.5% 1.8% +2.7%
4 $7.0621.8% 3.8% +1.1% 17.9% 2.5% +3.1%
5 $10.01 36.1% 8.2% +1.4% 29.5% 5.3% +4.6%
I I I II I I
22.5hours or 1.1%. Tax revenues fall by7.4%. Even given the fact that our
modelis partial equilibrium, rudimentary calculations demonstratethat general
equilibrium effects are veryunlikelyto belargeenough to cause taxrevenues
fromdecreasing significantly in the short runasour results show. In terms of
the welfare cost of the tax we see that the DWLfallssignificantly. The ratio
of mean deadweight loss to tax revenue falls from 22.1%under the current system
to 19.0% under the 10% taxcutplan. For the 30% tax cut labor supply
increases by 2.7% while tax revenue falls by22.6%. Again we seethat deadweight
lossdecreases significantly with the ratio of deadweightloss to tax revenues
raised decreasing to 15.4%. In terms of distributional changesthe top quncile
has the greatest increase in utility as aratio to net income. Thus as expected,
decreasing taxes by a constant percentage reducesdeadweight Loss but does so in
a manner most beneficial to thoseindividuals who face the highest tax rates.
Thus Kemp—Roth type tax cuts have large effectsboth in terms of decreasing
deadweight loss and in decreasing government revenue.Without knowledge of
marginal government expenditure, it isdifficult to evaluate the tradeoff. But
we cannot recommend Kemp—Roth on welfare groundsalone given the substanr.ial fall
in government revenue.—31—
Table 3.4 Overall Kemp—Roth Tax Cut for Wives
Change in Changein
Tax Cut Tax Revenue Change in DWL
1. 10% —3.8% —10.6% +50.2
2.30% —16.2% —17.4% +117.0
For wives we do not present detailed quintile results becausetheoverall
pattern is similar to husbands. The mean results are given in Table 3.4.
Overall, we see that the labor supply response to a tax cut isgreater for wives
than for husbands. We expect this since thewage elasticity is about twice the
income elasticity so we should have a net increase in laborsupply. Furthermore
the difference in the elasticities is about four timesthat of husbands, and we
do observe a significantly largerresponse. For the 10% tax cut case labor
supply increases by 4.1% and tax revenues fall by 3.8%. For the 30%tax cut case
labor supply increases by 9.4% and tax revenues fallby 16.2%.
Our overall evaluation of the Kemp—Roth tax proposals is that whiletax
revenues will decrease by significantly less than the taxcut, overall government
revenue from the income and payroll tax will decline. Anargument might be made
that general equilibrium results may be large enough toreverse this conclusion, but
Idoubt that it is a validargument, especially in the short run. Thus, unlessa
strong argument can be made for reducinggovernment expenditures with little welfare
loss from the recipients, the
Ketnp—Roth tax cut proposals cannot be supportedon the
basis of our results. Theycertainly do not have the 'free lunch' properties
claimed by some of theirsupporters.NOTES
'sample selection criteria and budget set assumptions are discussed in
Hausman (1979). We note that farmers, the self—employed,and severely
disabled individuals are excluded from the sample. Potenta1. proolemsof tax
evasion and tax avoidence should be decreased by our sample selection
procedures. Also, for families with incomeswhich place them above the range
of the standard deduction, we used data from the Statistic of Incomewhich
should capture a large proportion of tax avoidance procedures.But data
problems will nevertheless remain. It certainly seems preferable,however,
to account for taxes rather than to ignore them asis the typical tradition
in the labor supply literature, e.g. Smith (1980), in which only oneof seven
papers recognizes the existence of incometaxation.
1a1 disagree with my discussant's remarks about his evidence on the
piling up of labor supply at kink points for two reasons. First,the
presence of r. reduces to zero the probabilitythat anyone is observed at a
kink point. 7e would still observe a dispersion of individuals overthe
budget set. Second, since the kink points differfor each individual, I do
not see how a casual look at the data gives us moreevidence. Lastly, he is
incorrect in his claim that the econometric procedures depend critically on
exact knowledge of the location of the kink points.
2This specification of different tastes for leisure is perhaps the most
controversial part of the model since it represents the most marked departure
from usual labor supply models where coefficients are assumedidentical
across individuals. There all population heterogeneityarises through the
additive disturbance term n. ,e.g.the labor supply models contained in Smith
(1980). A further discussin is contained in Hausman (1979). To testfor
robustness of the specification in Hausman (l979a) I tried different
functional forms for the probability distribution. Also, Burtless—Hausman
(1978) and Hausman (1979) used instrumental variable techniqueswhich do not
depend on normality assumptions. Nor do they depend onthe normal good
assumption for leisure. The results were quite simliar tothe full maximum
likelihood model estimates. I disagree with my discussant's remarks onthe
robustness of the procedure. My investigations lead me tobelieve that the
procedures I use are considerably more robust thanthe reservation wage model
of labor supply with its unsupported proportionality assumption.For
instance, in his latest estimates which ignore theexistence of taxes,
Heclnan (1980, p.229), my discussant's estimate of the uncompensatedlabor
supply elasticity for wives changes from 2.1 to 4.8with only a minor change
in econometric specification. Both estimates are quite high withthe latter
• estimate absurdly so. My estimates are considerably more robust to
econometric specification as the labor supply elasticities for the three
different budget sets of Table 1.2 indicates.
3other definitions are discussed in Auerbach—Roser' (1980).4The women's sample might be better than the men's sample fortesting
this option because the sensitivity around zero hours for a man is probably
quite small. Thus biases are not apt to be important for men. However,
subsequent simulations have indicated that while the bias is slightly larger
for women, it is still probably small enough to be ignored.
5Method (4) may also be satisfactory for a firstapproximation.
6Wh.ile relativecomputer costs are difficult to compare, a simultaion on
the full sample of 1000 families on the MIT computer costs around $60.
7When we refer to the current taxsystem, we are actually using the 1975
data which the model was estimated with. However, except for the rise in
social security contribution, the taxation f labor income has not changed
significantly since 1975.— 33—
REFERENCES
Atkinson, A. and J. Stiglitz, "The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus
Indirect Taxation", Journal of Public Economics, 6.
Auerbach, A. and H. Rosen (1980), "Will the Real Excess Burden Stand Up?"
mimeo.
Burtless, C. and J. Hausman (1978), "The Effect of Taxation on Labor Supply:
The Gary NIT Experiment", Journal of Political Economy, 86.
Diamond, P. and D. McFadden(1974), "Some Uses of the Expenditure Function in
Public Finance", Journal of Public Economics, 3.
Hausman, J. (1979), "The Effect of Taxes on Labor Supply", paper presented
at Brook:Lngs Conference on Taxation. Forthcoming in H. Aaron and J.
Pechman, The Effect of Taxes on Economic Activity.
Hausinan, J. (1979a),"The effect of wages, Taxes, and Fixed Costs on Womens'
Labor Force Participation", Journal of Public Economics, 14, 1980,
pp. 161—194.
Hausman, J. (1979b), "The Econometrics of Labor Supply on Convex Budget Sets",
Economic Letters, 3.
Hausman, J. (1979c), "Exact Consumers' Surplus and Deadweight Loss", forthcoming
in American Economic Review.
Heckman, J. (1980), 'Sample Bias as a Epecification Error," in jP. Smith
(1980).
Smith, J.P. (editor), (1980) Female Labor Supply, Princeton, N.J.